External Return to Education in Europe by Strawinski, Pawel
Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques
International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives and Development
IRISS Working Papers






External Return to Education in Europe
by
Pawel Strawinski
1Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques
International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives and Development
External Return to Education in Europe
Pawel Strawinski
University of Warsaw
Abstract This paper provides an international comparison of external rates of return to education. As is pointed
out in the literature social return rate exceeds the pure technical rate of return by a considerable margin. However,
measuring social return is delicate due to methodological and data problems. The exploited approach is based
on a comparative advantage theory. It allows us to control for potential endogeneity problem and a self-selection
into different education regimes. We ﬁnd that external return is positive in all European countries. However the
magnitude of these returns varies. It seems that the external return is higher in small economies in which the
number of highly educated people is low.
Reference IRISS Working Paper 2009-09, CEPS/INSTEAD, Differdange, Luxembourg
URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/irs/iriswp/2009-09.html
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reﬂect views of
CEPS/INSTEAD. IRISS Working Papers are not subject to any review process. Errors and omissions are the sole
responsibility of the author(s).
(CEPS/INSTEAD internal doc. #07-09-0479-E)
2  1 











This paper provides an international comparison of external rates of return to education. As is 
pointed out in the literature social return rate exceeds the pure technical rate of return by a 
considerable margin. However, measuring social return is delicate due to methodological and 
data problems. The exploited approach is based on a comparative advantage theory. It allows 
us to control for potential endogeneity problem and a self-selection into different education 
regimes.  We  find  that  external  return  is  positive  in  all  European  countries.  However  the 
magnitude  of  these  returns  varies.  It  seems  that  the  external  return  is  higher  in  small 
economies in which the number of highly educated people is low. 
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While numerous studies have proved that investments in education is profitable at the 
individual  level.  This  paper  investigates  human  capital  externalities  in  several  European 
countries.  Such  phenomenon  exists  because  the  decision  to  invest  in  education  increases 
individual  productivity  and  hence  wages,  and  also  may  influence  the  productivity  of  the 
others. Despite that fact, there is no general scheme to finance education. In some countries 
investments in education at higher levels are supported by the state, while in the others are 
solely  private.    Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  verify  whether  educational  subsidies  policy 
enhances the welfare of the society. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  investment  in  human  capital  creates  a  great  opportunity  for 
people, families, firms and a society as a whole. They are considered as the simplest way to 
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achieve higher levels of social welfare. Human capital accumulation accelerates technological 
and  economic  growth.  Education  improves  workers’  productivity  and  therefore  has  an 
influence on earnings. However, the total gains from investments in an education could be 
higher than an economic rate of return. They may create many positive externalities for the 
society, for instance, better hygiene and health standards. Educated people are presumed to be 
innovative, and others not so well educated often follow their new habits and style of life. 
Educated societies have better capabilities of understanding and processing new information’s 
and  transmits  this  information  to  the  other  members.  Therefore,  it  is  rather  obvious  that 
educational external effect exists. Unfortunately, these external effects are hard to quantify. 
Many studies find that an additional year of schooling increases individual wages by 5-
10%, even up to 15% for the countries with relatively low  GDP per capita, those which 
experience  an  economic  expansion  (Psacharopoulos  &  Patrinos,  2002).  However,  the 
economic consequences of a change in the average schooling may differ from this private 
return. A change in an average education level increases skilled-work supply, and also could 
have an influence on the labour demand. Such growth may raise total wages and a private 
returns to education for two separate reasons. First, the standard neoclassical model suggests 
that, if educated and uneducated workers are imperfect substitutes, an increase in the share of 
educated workers will raise wages for both groups. Secondly, there may exist a human capital 
spill-overs resulting from the exchange of ideas and learning-by-doing. Low educated persons 
may acquire the skills in a simple way by imitating highly educated workers. The wage rise is 
an  effect  of  increased  productivity,  however,  it  is  less  than  the  private  rate  of  return  to 
education if schooling has also a signalling effect, or other production factors are inelastically 
supplied. Therefore, the value of education to a society may exceed the private return rate, 
because of positive external returns. Despite the potential importance of this question for the 
economic policy, much less is known about the external return to education than the private 
returns. 
The concept of external return to education has been brought into economic analysis by 
Acemoglu & Angrist (1999) and their approach was utilised in work extended by Moretti 
(2004). The analysis departs from the concept of social capital. Bordieu (1986) raises the 
argument that “Social capital is an attribute of an individual in a social context. One acquires 
social capital through purposeful action and can transform social capital into conventional 
economic gain”. In this context, social return to education may be defined as a share of return 
that may be attributed to the social capital. The social effects increase a return from education, 
but cannot be captured in standard human-capital based framework.    3 
To formalize this concept Moretti (2004) defined the social return to education as a sum 
of the human capital return and the external return. The latter is defined as the effect of an 
increase in the share of educated workers in the area on total wages minus the private return. 
For  the  aforementioned  reasons,  private  and  external  return  should  be  estimated 
simultaneously.  However,  there  is  no  straightforward  measure  that  captures  the  external 
return to education. The usual proxy suggested in the literature is an effect of an increase in 
the share of educated workers.  
A few existing studies have considered the external return to education. The evidence 
about the size of this effect is mixed even for one country. In this study we address a question: 
Is the level of the external return similar in all European countries or it differs. If the external 
return varies, it is interesting to ask a further question: does this variety equalise a social 
return to education among countries or does it rather stresses the differences in profitability of 
attaining  higher  education  in  different  countries.  This  is  an  important  issue  from  policy 
making point of view. If the social return to education is nearly equal in Europe there are no 
direct economic incentives that make people emigrate in order to achieve a higher return and 
hence better living conditions. If the reverse is true, after labour market liberalisation one 
could expect increased migrations among well-educated persons.    
In the article, an external return to education is considered. This issue is not broadly 
discussed and we add to existing literature a comprehensive comparative study for several 
European countries. The model is based on the comparative advantage theory and estimates 
Mincerian  wage  equations.  To  assure  the  robustness  of  the  main  results  we  explore  two 
different datasets, namely the CHER for the 1990-2000 period, and the ECHP for 1994-2001. 
The novelty of our research is to conduct the exercise on internationally harmonised data. 
Furthermore, we make an effort to control for potential endogeneity of individuals and an 
average schooling and a self-selection process in education. 
The article is divided into five sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
literature. The second part raises methodological issues, presents an empirical model and our 
estimation strategy. Third part gives an overview on data used and describes all necessary 
adjustments. Section four reports and discuss main results, while the final part contains a 
summary and general conclusion.    
 
Literature review 
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Many economist study human capital returns to education. Several economic surveys 
find a positive relationship between an educational degree and the salary received. The labour 
market researches for United States indicate that each additional year of education pays with 
an average wage increase by 7.5% (Acemoglu and Angrist 1999). In similar article Blundell 
et al. (2005) showed, using various econometric techniques that having a university diploma 
raises the average salary by 25% in the United Kingdom. Analogous results are obtained in 
studies concerning European countries where an estimated rate of return ranges between 7 and 
12% Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2002).  For the European Union members Brunello et al. 
(2001) examined the Italian labour market data, and showed that the average yearly rate of 
return to an university education is about 6.2% for males, and 7.5% for females. Comparable 
results for UE15 were obtained by Harmon et al. (2002). They estimated the average annual 
rate on return of 6.5%. De la Fuente (2003) in a report prepared for European Commission 
estimated the yearly rate of return to education on 6.2%, while he stressed that in the long 
horizon there is an additional 3.1% premium from quicker technological development.    
An  empirical  literature  concerning  social  returns  to  education  is  rather  limited.  The 
evidence comes from a few studies. Studies conducted at the microeconomic level refer to 
individual’s  log  wages  explained  by  individual  years  of  schooling,  the  average  years  of 
schooling  in  the  relevant  geographical  area,  and  additional  control  variables.  The  social 
returns equal the sum of the two schooling coefficients: one for human capital return and the 
other for an external return. Among few works it is worth to emphasise, that Rauch (1993) 
found an evidence for 8.1% social rate of return with 3.3% external rate by comparing wage 
rise with the average education attained in the area. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) estimate of 
social return is around 7.5% (external 4.6%) using OLS methodology and 9.1% with 1.8% 
external rate for IV method. Moretti (2004) estimated spill-overs from college education by 
comparing  wages  for  otherwise  similar  individuals  who  work  in  the  cities  with  different 
shares  of  college  graduates  in  the  labour  force,  and  found  a  positive  and  a  significant 
relationship between an increased supply of college graduates and average wages. The results 
indicate  a  large  positive  relationship  between  individual  wages  and  a  share  of  college 
graduates, even when controlling for direct effect of individuals’ education on wages. Also 
spillover effect is present. Better educated workers on the labour market decrease the supply 
of  unskilled  work  and  therefore  cause  an  increase  of  their  wages.  However,  all 
aforementioned studies concern US labour market. 
The other branch of the research is within an industry sector analysis. Sekelletoriu and 
Maysami (2004) study this type of an external effect in Latin American countries. For the   5 
United Kingdom, Kirby and Riley (2008) found a positive external return to education at the 
industry level. The margin is around 3% which is comparable to the previous studies in that 
field. 
The macroeconomic approach to return to education uses cross-country regressions and 
takes the log of GDP per capita explained by an average schooling and additional control 
variables. Heckman and Klenow (1997) estimate the size of the educational externality by 
comparing  the  schooling  coefficient  from  the  human  capital  model  with  one  from 
macroeconomic model. Their estimate of social return is 10.6%. Bils and Klenow (1998) use 
similar  approach.  When  they  take  into  account  differences  in  technology,  social  returns 
become similar to private returns. In  a similar study Topel (1999) also use cross-country 
regressions and estimate external return to education on 6.2%. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) 
looked  at  the  effect  of  average  education  on  workers’  wages  and  have  found  significant 
externalities. Nevertheless, average and one’s own education may be highly correlated. In 




Measuring the level of social capital is an ambiguous task. There is no widely held 
consensus on how to measure social capital. The underlying problem is that factors that are 
potentially responsible for social capital creation are not easy to quantify. Some methods, 
proposed  in  literature,  suggest  that  the  level  of  education  of  the  population,  and  its 
geographical concentration, are good proxies for associative behaviour, and therefore can be 
thought as measures for external effect as a part of a social capital. 
There are several ways to estimate the rate of return to education. In this research we 
employ the Mincer human capital model (1974). This is the most frequently used model in 
empirical economics. The Mincerian wage equations are commonly used in several labour 
economic fields, such as return to education, wage inequalities, or pay-gender discrimination 
gap.  In this  method, an  empirical  data are fitted to  logarithm of actual wage by a linear 
regression  model.  Characteristics  such  as  level  of  education,  age  as  a  measure  of  work 
experience and socio-demographic characteristics are used as explanatory variables. Human 
capital may be viewed as embodied in personal characteristics. This basic model is extended 
by  inclusion  of  the  mechanism  that  allows  for  controlling  non-random  selection  into 
education.   6 
Analysis of social return to education beside a pure technical rate of return to education 
has to take into consideration educational spillover effects. Education may affect national 
income in ways that are not fully measured by wages, for instance, is positively related with 
labour force participation. Several aspects of everyday life, as for instance, health or safety 
standards,  an  election  participation  and  a  voting  behaviour  are  influenced  by  society 
education level. For example, in developing countries education is negatively associated with 
women’s fertility and positively with infants’ health (Kreuger and Lindahl 2001). The more 
educated societies the better they understand the interdependencies among different features, 
and are said to undertake better collective decision. Those indirect effects are a vital part of a 
social  return.  Moretti  (2004)  formulated  a  theoretical  framework  that  allows  for  a  social 
return. In his general equilibrium model an increase in the number of educated workers in the 
local labour market may raise the average wage above the private return to schooling even in 
the absence of any spillovers. This is the case in the market with high intensity of high-skilled 
workers. The concern is that according to these model individuals in regions with high human 
capital are inherently better workers than individuals with the same observable characteristics 
who live in the low human capital intensity. This situation leads to self-selection problem, as 
predicted by a Roy model of self-selection. 
Our empirical approach is similar to Acemoglu & Angrist (1999). We define social 
return to education as a sum of human capital return to education and the indirect effect 
measure by an increase in the share of educated workers on wages. The latter is called in the 
literature external wage effect in the literature. It equalled to the effect of an increase in the 
share of educated workers minus the effect owed to private returns to education. The model 
itself is based on a comparative advantage theory. Each individual chooses their preferred 
education level. In order to do that, she compares streams of future incomes with alternative 
education levels. At every moment they can withdraw from the education system. Continuing 
education is considered as an investment, because there is a necessity to choose between 
current costs and future incomes. Studies postpone the entrance to the labour market and 
lessen working activity time. Analogously to the standard cost benefit analysis of investment 
project, it is possible to calculate the internal rate of return.  
To reduce the complexity of the analysis the rate of return to education is treated as the 
parameter characteristic of an individual. It is assumed, that undertaking investment at an 
individual  level  has  no  impact  on  general  equilibrium  of  the  economy.  Henceforth,  the 
marginal  return  rate  is  not  affected  by  the  decision  of  other  society  members.  The  next   7 
simplifying assumption is that the study costs are uniformly distributed over a study period. In 
reality, they are usually higher at the beginning and then decline.     
Let Iij be lifetime labour income of person i with education level j. Let Xi be a vector of 
observable abilities and socio-demographic characteristics and εi a vector of unobservable 
terms that have an influence on the labour income. Then the lifetime income is defined by 
) , ( i i ij X f I                                               (1) 
Let’s assume that the cost of achieving education level j for an individual i is equal Cij. 
It varies among individuals due to specific abilities and predispositions heterogeneity. Let Vij 
be a value of utility function derived for person i from an education level j. The mechanism of 
choosing the desired education level can be presented as: 
  ij ij
j
ij C I V   max                                           (2) 
It  is  presumed  that  people  are  behaving  according  to  a  maximum  utility  theory. 
Therefore,  one  chooses  such an  education  level  j,  that maximises  the difference  between 
stream of future incomes attached to this level and the cost required to achieve it.  
The analytic formula is an extension of Willis and Rosen (1979) model of demand for 
education  combined with Moretti (2004) approach.  From the former we borrow selection 
mechanism and from the latter additional regressor for educational share in the local area. In 
our  model  beside  human  capital  return  we  also  consider  social  return  to  education.  We 
distinguish between the high skilled workers H and low-skilled ones L. We put an emphasis 
on  return  to  a  secondary  level  of  education  (high  school  or  adequate)  and  tertiary  level 
(university  or  adequate).  First  stage  of  education,  the  primary  school  is  compulsory  and 
therefore, a lack of proper comparison group makes impossible a return calculation for that 
education  level.  Each  education  level  has  its  own  initial  earnings,  which  are  yl0  for  the 
secondary education and yh0 for the tertiary. We assume that wages are increasing functions of 
the time. The rate of growth depends on skills achieved during an education process and is gh 
for person with  higher  skill  level  (university or equivalent  education in  case of return to 
tertiary education, or high school or equivalent in case of secondary education) and gl for low-
skilled workers. Schooling process is time-consuming. To reach a higher degree, a person has 
to  dedicate  some  of  his  potential  labour  activity  time.  The  amount  of  time  necessary  to 
achieve a degree is marked with T years. If one's chooses higher level of education their 
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The variable t represents working time and (t-T) is a measure of working experience. 
We can denote income equation for a low educated person in a similar way: 
    t t g y t y h l Li 0 ) exp( ) ( 0              (4) 
An  income stream is determined by two parameters: the starting salary for each 
education level y.0 and the growth rate g. A person, while making decision about a desired 
education  level  compares  discounted  future  values  of  a  potential  income.  The  person  i 
chooses university education if the net benefits from achieving higher degree are greater than 
the benefits from lower level of education. 
The discounted values of an education level reflect an economic mechanism of choosing 
between two different education levels. The salary level is a function of education, experience 
measured by age and social and demographic characteristics. It is commonly assumed in the 
labour economy that the distribution of earnings is  well approximated by the log normal 
distribution. The wage equation for each education level could be represented by the classical 
linear regression model. Following Acemoglu&Angrist (1999) and Moretti (2004), we also 
allow  for  human  capital  spillovers  by  letting  worker’s  productivity  depend  on  share  of 
educated workers in the local labour market. We add human capital quality measure to wage 
equation 
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where Xi is a matrix of socio-demographic characteristics including working experience 
and its square, beta’s are wage equation coefficients, Yedui is a number of years spent in an 
education system (education level proxy), H is a number of high skilled workers in a local 
labour  market  and  L  is  a  size  of  local  low-skilled  labour  force.  The     coefficient  is  an 
estimate of the average yearly return to schooling and  is a proxy for the external effect. The 
latter is the coefficient of interest, which is the estimate of the effect of higher education share 
on average wages after controlling for the private returns to education. 
As it pointed out by Moretti (2004), the wage of uneducated workers benefit for at least 
two reasons from an increase in a share of educated workers. First, an increase in the number 
of  educated  workers  raises  uneducated  workers’  productivity  because  of  imperfect 
substitution. Second, the spillover further raises their productivity.  
The  principal  challenge  in  estimating  a  causal  effect  of  education  on  wages  is 
identification. An individual education and average schooling levels could be both correlated 
with  wages  for  various  reasons,  so  the  observed  relationship  between  variables  is  not   9 
necessarily casual (Acemoglu and Angrist 1999). The education level is up to some point pre-
determined by the social background of the person (Becker 1976). It is more likely that a 
person decide to study when it grows up in the area where most of the people are highly 
educated. As a result, owns and the average education are possibly correlated.  Moreover, 
educational  decision  depends  on  ability  of  the  person  which  is  not  directly  observed. 
Therefore, process of choosing  a desired education level could be treated as that of self-
selection.  Also  as  it  shown  in  many  studies  individual  wages  are  related  to  unobserved 
characteristic (i.e. ability). There could be an endogeneity problem and a potential sample 
selection problem. As a result the standard estimators would be inconsistent. Being aware of 
those  problems,  as  is  pointed  out  in  the  contemporary  economic  literature  (for  instance, 
Blundell et al. 2005) to alleviate the endogeneity problem one has to use instrumental variable 
approach,  and  in  the  case  of  sample  selection  bias  it  is  necessary  to  include  a  selection 
equation  in  the  model.  It  describes  the  mechanism  of  selecting  the  observations  to  the 
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where w0 is a selection indicator interpreted as a wage offer above a reservation wage, Zi is a 




For our purpose of undertaking analysis of external effect we use two broad datasets. 
The first is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP is harmonised 
cross-national longitudinal survey focusing on households, incomes and living conditions. 
The  survey  runs  from  1994  to  2001  and  covers  15  European  Union  member  states.  The 
sample for each  year consist  of  information  about  65,000 households and 130,000  adults 
(170.00 individuals including children). Unfortunately, we are not able to take an advantage 
of longitudinal nature of the data in the analysis for at least two reasons. Firstly, for the most 
of  the  countries  the  data  has  a  rolling  panel  design,  secondly  the  results  for  remaining 
countries may be heavy influenced by the attrition bias.  
The second source of empirical data is the Consortium for Household Panels for Socio-
Economic Research (CHER). This  is  internationally comparative microeconomic database 
that integrates longitudinal datasets in Europe and the USA over a large number of years   10 
(1990-2001),  but  for  most  of  the  countries  data  is  available  since  1994,  and  countries 
including those in the ECHP. The base contains data for 18 countries (14 EU members plus 
Switzerland, Poland, Hungary and the United States). The topics  covered in  the  data are 
labour force participation and related issues, income components and social relations. For the 
second sample the averages of about 75.000 households and 150.000 individuals surveyed 
yearly could be misleading, because the number of participating countries varies from year to 
year.  
Both abovementioned datasets are constructed from national surveys and for that reason 
not all variables relevant for the purpose of the analysis are available for all countries. We will 
discuss this issue later. The list of countries and sample sizes are presented in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1. about here 
 
The empirical sample is restricted in several dimensions. Firstly, analogously to Kirby 
& Riley (2008) research we narrow the analysis to the individuals at working age 30-55. 
Younger persons are omitted to avoid a bias from direct influence of schooling decision on 
earnings. In some countries the first job contract is limited by the law. In case of the older 
workers we tried to exclude the influence of retirement decision. Secondly, we concentrate on 
persons  who  receive  incomes  from  work  or  self-employment.  In  addition,  we  excluded 
information about part-time employees and persons who combine incomes from employment 
and social assistance or those who declare that work is not their main source of income. This 
step is necessary because data does not provide information about the exact number of hours 
worked,  so  it  is  not  possible  to  calculate  hypothetical  full  time  earnings.  In  addition,  all 
previously mentioned groups of workers may decide to work on non-economical basis, so 
their  wage  may  not  reflect  the  true  value  of  their  working  abilities.  In  the  self-selection 
specification we control source of income directly in a selection equation. The next restriction 
involves farming income, which is highly correlated with land productivity, and very weakly 
related  to  human  capital  productivity.  As  a  consequence,  farmer’s  income  is  only  partly 
determined by its education and abilities. To overcome the problem of eventual bias we omit 
the data from households for which farming was the only or main income source. This way of 
handling the problem is justified in economic theory.  
The additional restrictions come from data availability issue. The missing information 
on  labour  income  is  controlled  by  selection;  however,  for  Poland  this  variable  is  not   11 
available
3. To construct  a  proxy for measuring spillover effects we nee d  to explore the 
information about obtained education level and  location of  the residence (the NUTS
4 and 
town size variables). Unfortunately, they were not available for vital number of countries in 
both samples. Moreover, the NUTS information if is presen t it is available only at NUTS1 
level, that means large areas of 3 -7 million inhabitants. For those reason s, small countries: 
Luxembourg and Denmark consist only one NUTS. In addition , for Finland and Sweden the 
NUTS variable is not available in  the CHER sample. For several countries, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden in both samples and the United Kingdom (the ECHP sample 
only) town size variable is not available due to data anonymity reason.  Moreover, the 
definition of the variable differs be tween the ECHP and the CHER data. In a former town 
variable takes three distinct values while in the latter only two. In addition, we have to discard 
incomplete observations. 
Being aware of major sample reductions especially in terms of the number of examined 
countries  we decided to  adjust our empirical strategy to  available  data and  perform the 
analysis on two levels of data disaggregation: NUTS and town and NUTS level. In the former 
educational shares are calculated for the  areas defined by product of NUTS and town size 
variable while in the latter they are defined by NUTS only.  We are aware that the latter 
method of data preparation might be not suitable for capturing the external effect even if they 
exist.  
The full list of considered countries is presented in Table 2 for both samples.    
 
TABLE 2. about here 
 
The datasets does not directly provide information on years of schooling. For the 
purpose of analysis this was imputed using information contained in achieved education level. 
In order to have comparable results across countries we made strong assumption that ISCED 
level 2 requires 9 years of education, level 3 12 years and level 5 or 6 17 years of ed ucation. 
Before the return rate to university is calculated, basic sample characteristics for each country 
are analysed. Data are presented for  the NUTS level only because if town size variable is 
collected, it is very rarely missing. After all data correction operations about a third of initial 
observations are left in the sample for each country. The main characteristics are presented in 
Table 3a for the ECHP sample and in Table 3b for the CHER sample, respectively.  
                                                 
3 We excluded the USA from the CHER sample as non-European country. 
4 NUTS – Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics, territory units used by Eurostat.    12 
 
TABLE 3a&3b. About here. 
 
The  sample  averages  for  gender,  number  of  years  spent  in  education  and  years  of 
working experience are fairly similar in both datasets. Noticeable differences can be observed 
for  family  and  self-selection  indicators  and  also  for  the  logarithm  of  wages.  The  part  of 
discrepancy can be attributed to the differences in sampling period. Time span in the CHER 
sample is usually shorter than that of the ECHP. The difference in the family variable comes 
from its construction. In the ECHP sample, it is derived from the marital status variable, while 
in case of the CHER sample from the household size. This was done purposely to alleviate the 
problem of missing values for the marital status in the CHER sample. The varying values for 
the  self-employment  dummy  reflect  a  different  definition  of  that  variable.  Generally,  a 
definition in the CHER sample comes from a labour activity section and includes a self-
employed and self-employed with co-workers, whereas in the ECHP the self-employed are 
identified by a declared main source of income. The dependent variable, an actual labour 
income, is deflated by the HCPI to be comparable across different countries, and then it is log 
transformed. For all but two countries, namely Ireland and the United Kingdom, the averages 
of log wage are higher in the CHER sample; besides that the definition is the same in both 
datasets. Fortunately, this difference would have no influence on the results, because we are 
interested in relative percentage differences between low and high educated workers, not the 
actual wages.  
 
TABLE 4. About here. 
 
Table 4. presents the educational structure in analysed European countries. The levels 
are based on the ISCED classification. Persons that declare ISCED level 3 are treated as 
secondary education possessors, and these who report a higher ISCED level are considered as 
highly educated. There are tremendous disparities in educational shares between European 
states. Three of them, namely Austria, Germany and Sweden are characterised by the fact that 
vast shares of its citizens poses at least secondary education On the other hand, secondary 
education is rather rare in Portugal, the United Kingdom and Spain. For education at the 
university level observed variation is even greater. There is a group of countries with low 
share of highly educated citizens that includes Austria, Italy and Portugal. Conversely, we   13 
have  Belgium  and  protestant  countries  (except  the  Netherlands)  where  density  of  highly 
educated people is high.  
This  diversified  education  structure  among  European  countries  indicates  that  the 
accumulation  of  human  capital  is  also  diversified.  There  is  a  clear  north-south  gap.  In 
northern European countries the shares of secondary and tertiary education are higher than in 




In this section we present results from an estimation of the external returns to education 
models based on cross–sectional treatment of data from the ECHP and the CHER. To provide 
robustness of the results we conducted the analysis with use of different estimation methods. 
Having in mind reasons enumerated in the methodological section, apart from standard OLS, 
we use an instrumental variable approach (IV). This method became a standard estimation 
technique used in cases where endogenous variable is present in an estimated equation. In our 
context,  it  is  evident  that  personal  education  level  could  be  correlated  with  the  average 
education level in the neighbouring area, and therefore standard OLS based results could be 
inaccurate. In addition to control for possible self-selection we explored two-stage selection 
models (SEL). 
External returns to education are not well recognised in the literature. We stipulate that 
they are heterogeneous, what means that they could vary for different kinds and levels of 
education. Nowadays, vast majority of pupils successfully attain to finish secondary level of 
education. To certain extent this is requested by law, because schooling is compulsory until 
the ages of 16/18, depending on the country’s internal regulations. The different story is for 
the  university  education.  There  are  as  many  systems  as  countries.  In  other  words,  each 
country  has  its  unique  university  system.  The  differences  are  in  the  length  of  the  study 
periods, tuition fees and many other aspects.  
To capture eventual education’s spillover effect we create a variable that contains a 
share of secondary and tertiary school graduates in the local area. The local area is defined by 
NUTS variable for “NUTS-only” models and by product of the NUTS and town size variables 
for “NUTS and town size” models. However, the average education in the region may be 
correlated with individual education; therefore there is a need for an instrument to rule out the 
correlation.  Unfortunately,  in  the  dataset  good  instrument  for  educational  share  is  not 
available.    14 
Instead, we use a set of regional dummies. We assume that educational aspirations are 
the same in all regions. However, there is a problem with educational gap between towns in 
rural areas. Usually, town has a better educational infrastructure. Fortunately, the percent of 
the population living in towns is not directly related to educational aspirations and abilities, 
and therefore town size dummies could serve as instruments for educational share. To check 
validity of the instruments used we conducted the Shea test and found that they significantly 
explain endogenous regressor volatility. We ascertain that instruments are independent from 
unobservable  error  process  by  using  Sargan  test.  To  alleviate  possible  heteroscedasticity 
problem we employ GMM based IV estimates. This assured us that the obtained results are 
robust.  
The important variable for identification of the model parameters in case of instrumental 
variable and self-selection setting is a non-labour income. In the former it provides additional 
exogenous variable that could serve as an instrument, while in the latter act as an important 
determinant  of  labour  force  participation.  The  non-labour  income  is  observable  for  all 
individuals and not directly related to wages, henceforth could be used for identification of 
the selection process. 
The estimates for human capital return and spillover effects are reported in Table 5a and 
5b for the ECHP sample and in Table 6a and 6b for the CHER sample. The first tables (a) 
contain results for models in which the share of education in the local area is computed for 
areas defined by a product of NUTS and town size variable, whereas the second tables (b) 
present the outcomes for an analysis considering only NUTS region a local area indicator. 
We estimated three different specifications for each model, namely OLS, IV and SEL. 
To conserve the space we report OLS result when there is no evidence of endogeneity or 
selection. In cases where education share seems to be endogenuous and there is no selection 
we report IV result and when selection is present we stick to SEL ones. However, when the 
results from all three model specifications are very similar to one another we decided to report 
OLS  results,  as  the  simplest  method.  For  the  brevity  and  clarity  of  the  presentation  we 
decided to present only summary results. The full results can be found in the appendix. The 
second  column  of  each  result  table  reports  estimation  method  for  spillover  from  tertiary 
education, while in the seventh spillover for secondary education level is described. In the 
OLS model the average schooling is assumed to be exogenous. The instrumental variable 
estimates treat average the schooling as endogenous, while the selection model treats  the 
achieved level of education as a result of economic decision-making. In the former model 
several characteristics, namely gender, experience and its square, years of education, type of   15 
the family, non-labour income and also town size and regional dummies serve as instruments. 
In the latter these variables are used in a construction of the selection equation. The sizes and 
the magnitudes for the coefficients for variables included in the wage equation are in accord 
with the labour market theory. Positive sign for gender variable shows that employers tend to 
pay  higher  wages  to  the  men  than  women,  even  if  both  have  similar  qualifications  and 
working experience. This might be an indication of gender related wage discrimination. The 
coefficients of Mincerian wage equation are similar to those found in other studies and those 
for experience and experience squared may be interpreted as diminishing marginal returns 
from working experience. Despite some minor methodological differences, the estimates of 
human capital  return to education are  closely related to  Heinrich and  Hildebrandt  (2005) 
results obtained from ECHP data.  
 
TABLE 5a & 5b. About here. 
 
TABLE 6a & 6b. About here 
 
EXPLICITLY STATE THE REASON WHY OLS IV and SEL 
 
The first important observation is that in predominantly many models estimated on the 
ECHP sample simple OLS approach is not valid while it is sufficient especially for secondary 
education models based on the CHER data. This evidently suggests that the vast share of 
citizens in each country, especially in younger cohorts, poses at least secondary education, 
therefore  the  selection  is  weak.  Moreover,  the  way  of  constructing  an  educational  share 
variable does matter. This variable has lager variance in the ECHP sample. Additionally, in 
all  empirical  specifications  human  capital  return  to  education  estimates  are  positive, 
significant and have sizes comparable to ones found in the other studies. 
The external or splillover effect of education is found to be significant in all but one 
model. The exception is an analysis for Italy conducted with areas defined by NUTS as a 
proxy for capturing the effect, where the result is not significantly different from zero. As 
long as NUTS-based analysis is not capable of providing unequivocal evidence this is a not 
major  concern.  In  both  samples  analysed,  the  results  from  models  with  different  area 
definition are very closely related. This suggests that the size of the area is not that important 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  methodology  used.  However,  one  has  to  bear  in  mind  an 
implication from the underlying theory. The external effect arises in small local areas. When 
one uses instead of local areas large, non-homogeneous regions, it may be that the variable   16 
used  to  capture  the  external  effect  in  fact  describes  interregional  differences  within  the 
country rather than educational spillover. Dummies for regions included in the model control 
only  for  that  part  of  the  difference  that  do  not  change  with  time.  This  implies  that,  for 
example, variation in economic growth rate among the region is not controlled for. 
When we consider the results with area variable defined by NUTS and town size they 
are very similar in both samples and across countries. The overall size of the external effect to 
the tertiary education is around 1% with the lowest estimate for Belgium and the highest for 
Portugal and Ireland. Belgium is difficult country to analyse the external effect because it is 
made of three completely different parts. Perhaps this particular country should be treated as 
three one-NUTS countries and therefore omitted in the analysis.  The highest estimate for 
Ireland could be explained by the Irish economic boom in the 1990’s and that for Portugal by 
relative scarcity of highly educated people in that country. 
Once we move to analyse the results obtained at NUTS level the picture is blurred. 
Despite that Ireland and Portugal are countries with the highest estimated external returns to 
education again while Belgium again and Greece are among those with the lowest spillover 
effect.  The  external  return  to  the  secondary  education  is  generally  below  1%  with  an 
exception of Portugal in both samples, and Sweden and Finland in the ECHP sample. These 
results  confirm  the opinion that general  education  school  system  works very  good in  the 
Scandinavian countries. It also seems that European economies are much similar in terms of 
educational spillover effect. 
This difference between return rate to secondary and tertiary education is consistent 
with Kreuger and Lindahl (1998) findings, who argue that the expansion of human capital at 
lower level has non-wage effect, yet in particular, it reduces crime and welfare participation 
rate, while expansion at tertiary education creates spillover effect in the form of increased 
productivity and technological progress. Therefore, larger social returns in terms of wages 
should be observed for university level of education. 
Unfortunately, our empirical approach has potential and quite obvious shortcomings.  
The econometric models deal with individual data and, for that reason, are not able to fully 
include  some  additional  and  potentially  important  external  effects.  Secondary  schools, 
universities and also commercial and industrial areas are located mostly in towns. Therefore, 
towns accumulate human capital stock and observed spillover effect might be to some extent 
a town effect. We partly control for that by including in the analysis only those persons who 
declare to live in the same area for full survey period. On the other hand, for that reason the 
external effects are said to be stronger in the cities. Moreover, this should not be a problem in   17 
our research due to specific construction of the educational share variable. It poses a constant 
value for whole area defined by NUTS and a town size. Additionally, dummies for NUTS and 
town sizes in wage equation should eliminate the regional differences, and those for years 
differences related to time. However, a part of the measured return might reflect regional 
differences in “NUTS only” models. Secondly, due to cross-sectional nature of the data it was 




Our  study  suggests  that  there  exist  potentially  significant  spillovers  from  education. 
Analysing the effect of average education in the local area on individual’s wages we were 
able  to  replicate  standard  estimates  for  so-called  human  capital  returns  to  education.  In 
addition, we find that one percentage point increase in tertiary education share raises the 
workers’ wages by 1-2%, giving social return significantly above the private return. For the 
secondary education the external effect is weaker, as it was expected. The estimated size of 
the external effect is slightly lower than that found in studies for the US, but in this study 
country-wide  analysis  was  conducted,  while  other  authors  restrict  the  scope  to  cities  or 
industries in one country. 
During the investigation of the problem we found no evidence that external  returns 
offset human capital in a way that social returns are equalised, it is rather that the external 
effects are on similar level across European economies. In our opinion the important message 
is  that  existence  of  positive  externalities  is  confirmed.  The  evidence  on  the  returns  to 
education has an implication for both economic theory and policy. A large literature report 
estimates  the  private  return  to  education  on  the  order  of  6-10  percent.  However,  private 
returns are only part of the story. The economic literature stresses the role of external effect 
on education. The main reason is that the existence of external effects causes that private 
return underestimate the economic value of schooling. Our result supports the  belief that 
investing in an education is important from policy making point of view. Simply relying on 
individuals  to  cover  the  cost  of  education  may  direct  to  noteworthy  underinvestment  in 
comparison to the socially optimal level. The open question and beyond the scope of the 
conducted research is the optimal method of financing higher education. 
The  last  concern  is  that  the  model  presented  in  the  article  does  not  account  for 
unobserved  heterogeneity  in  ability.  Identification  of  external  effect  to  education  requires 
exogenous variation in both individual and average schooling. Diversification of the former is   18 
obvious.  For  the  latter  in  this  paper,  we  use  a  geographical  and  educational  structure  of 
population to mimic variation in the average schooling. Nevertheless, individuals that are live 
in regions with high level of human capital may be simply better workers than those who live 
in regions with low human capital. As is pointed out by Rauch (1993) higher quality workers 
may move to areas with higher levels of educational share. This is straight consequence of 
Roy  model,  where  the  skills  move  to  job  at  which  are  better  valued.  Regions  that  have 
industrial structure that requires more educated workers are also likely to receive better price 
for unobserved ability (Moretti 2004). We tried to control for those effects by including area 
dummies and selection mechanism. 
The overall results provide evidence that educational externalities exists and account for 
about 20% of the private return. The straightforward implication for policy is that private 
investments  in  education  may  be  not  enough  to  grant  socially  optimal  share  of  higher 
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Table 1. Sample sizes 
Sample  ECHP  CHER 
   full  NUTS  NUTS&town  full  NUTS  NUTS&town 
Austria  44909  15007  11945  45920  17412  4231 
Belgium  40698  16815  13267  48344  13319  13304 
Denmark  36081  17432  13414  36820  18029  3985 
Finland  41831  18854  13725  41982  20706  0 
France  86770  32818  26243  95171  33933  7242 
Germany  92201  38249  0  142652  57667  0 
Greece  83276  25073  19567  85748  30356  6738 
Hungary           25668  8088  4604 
Ireland  44171  13035  7768  53116  16982  2489 
Italy  122429  43032  33794  129151  46094  0 
Luxembourg  36618  15003  11603  36626  14286  14286 
Netherlands  71010  0  0  72141  0  0 
Portugal  87682  29524  25335  91437  34935  8451 
Spain  114566  33766  24579  115779  36856  0 
Sweden  45177  22863  20536          
Switzerland           14387  4998  4995 
United Kingdom  67790  28567  23622  103498  36408  31319 
Source: Own computation based on ECHP and CHER data. 
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Table 2. NUTS and town variable availability 
Country  ECHP  CHER 
   NUTS  town  NUTS  town 
Austria  3  +  3  + 
Belgium  3  +  3  + 
Denmark  1  +  1  + 
Finland  6     1    
France  8  +  8  + 
Germany  15     16    
Greece  4  +  4  + 
Ireland  2  +  2  + 
Italy  11     11    
Luxemburg  1  +  1  + 
Portugal  7  +  7  + 
Spain  7     7    
Sweden  8          
The Netherlands             
United Kingdom  11     66  + 
Source: Own calculation based on ECHP and CHER data. 
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Table 3a. ECHP sample average characteristics 
country  log wage  gender  experience  years of  family  public  self 
            education     employment  employment 
Austria  9.73  0.35  21.22  12.08  0.62  0.27  0.06 
   0.63  0.48  9.49  1.94  0.49  0.44  0.24 
Belgium  9.73  0.36  20.02  13.57  0.68  0.23  0.06 
   0.65  0.48  10.00  3.25  0.46  0.42  0.24 
Denmark  9.64  0.43  21.92  13.42  0.67  0.39  0.04 
   0.55  0.50  10.05  2.97  0.47  0.49  0.20 
Finland  9.73  0.47  22.43  13.38  0.63  0.37  0.06 
   0.79  0.50  10.04  3.12  0.48  0.48  0.24 
France  9.74  0.40  22.25  12.34  0.66  0.31  0.07 
   0.66  0.49  10.05  3.24  0.47  0.46  0.26 
Germany  9.76  0.34  22.03  13.02  0.62  0.26  0.08 
   0.62  0.48  9.85  2.65  0.49  0.44  0.26 
Greece  9.31  0.34  21.63  12.46  0.75  0.28  0.26 
   0.66  0.47  10.40  3.23  0.44  0.45  0.44 
Ireland  9.58  0.32  20.55  12.34  0.68  0.33  0.12 
   0.66  0.47  9.96  2.99  0.46  0.47  0.32 
Italy  9.46  0.35  22.99  11.26  0.71  0.29  0.20 
   0.74  0.48  9.79  2.54  0.45  0.45  0.40 
Luxembourg  10.23  0.31  21.26  12.13  0.60  0.25  0.05 
   0.56  0.46  9.85  3.05  0.49  0.43  0.23 
Portugal  9.09  0.41  22.89  10.48  0.75  0.20  0.13 
   0.79  0.49  10.07  2.76  0.43  0.40  0.33 
Spain  9.48  0.32  21.42  12.14  0.68  0.22  0.14 
   0.78  0.47  10.55  3.49  0.47  0.41  0.35 
Sweden  9.29  0.45  22.89  13.30  0.25  0.21  0.03 
   0.73  0.50  10.60  2.92  0.44  0.40  0.18 
United Kingdom  9.65  0.37  21.38  13.40  0.65  0.24  0.12 
   0.72  0.48  10.76  3.69  0.48  0.43  0.32 
Source: Own calculation based on ECHP data. 
The numbers in top row for each country represents mean value of the characteristics in the sample; the numbers 
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Table 3b. CHER sample average characteristics 
country  log wage  gender  experience  years of  family  public  self 
            education     employment  employment 
Austria  12.42  0.36  21.64  11.99  0.88  0.25  0.14 
   0.58  0.48  9.62  1.95  0.32  0.43  0.35 
Belgium  13.41  0.36  20.56  13.08  0.91  0.27  0.14 
   0.73  0.48  9.84  3.33  0.29  0.44  0.35 
Denmark  11.94  0.42  22.06  13.36  0.90  0.38  0.06 
   0.53  0.49  10.11  2.98  0.30  0.49  0.24 
Finland  11.21  0.47  22.58  13.31  0.84  0.36  0.13 
   0.98  0.50  10.07  3.12  0.36  0.48  0.34 
France  11.61  0.40  22.40  12.29  0.90  0.30  0.08 
   0.65  0.49  10.09  3.23  0.30  0.46  0.27 
Germany  10.51  0.32  21.26  13.25  0.82  0.27  0.03 
   0.56  0.47  10.16  2.86  0.38  0.44  0.18 
Greece  15.02  0.34  22.90  12.06  0.95  0.24  0.34 
   0.69  0.47  10.88  3.22  0.21  0.43  0.47 
Hungary  13.47  0.47  22.77  11.28  0.95  0.41  0.07 
   0.69  0.50  9.06  2.89  0.21  0.49  0.26 
Ireland  9.54  0.30  21.35  12.13  0.92  0.29  0.15 
   0.64  0.46  10.45  3.00  0.27  0.46  0.36 
Italy  10.16  0.34  23.22  11.19  0.94  0.28  0.25 
   0.57  0.47  9.88  2.53  0.25  0.45  0.43 
Luxembourg  14.02  0.30  20.62  12.32  0.85  0.26  0.03 
   0.57  0.46  9.88  3.10  0.36  0.44  0.16 
Portugal  14.21  0.43  23.58  10.34  0.98  0.18  0.17 
   0.71  0.49  10.30  2.66  0.13  0.38  0.37 
Spain  14.54  0.31  21.88  11.98  0.96  0.20  0.22 
   0.71  0.46  10.72  3.47  0.20  0.40  0.42 
Switzerland  11.34  0.23  22.67  12.75  0.81  0.23  0.00 
   0.46  0.42  10.31  2.33  0.39  0.42  0.02 
United Kingdom  9.44  0.37  21.57  12.96  0.88  0.22  0.09 
   0.56  0.48  10.73  3.77  0.32  0.42  0.29 
Source: Own calculation based on CHER data. 
The numbers in top row for each country represents mean value of the characteristics in the sample; the numbers 
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Table 4. Educational structure in European countries 
Education levels  ECHP  CHER 
   tertiary  secondary  tertiary  secondary 
Austria  6.03  59.88  6.04  59.79 
Belgium  27.62  32.34  24.39  29.38 
Denmark  25.49  42.16  25.53  42.19 
Finland  25.49  38.22       
France  20.91  26.30  21.02  26.26 
Germany  18.13  56.38  23.00  50.52 
Greece  14.86  28.06  15.11  28.09 
Hungary        10.29  22.18 
Ireland  12.91  34.27  13.23  34.30 
Italy  6.75  32.49  6.88  32.59 
Luxembourg  14.52  33.07  15.90  33.92 
Netherlands  9.80  28.05  9.96  28.16 
Portugal  7.01  12.35  7.00  12.32 
Spain  16.44  18.30  16.73  18.06 
Sweden  25.31  44.89       
Switzerland        20.03  61.08 
United Kingdom  35.94  12.54  30.68  10.40 
Source: Own computation based on ECHP and CHER data. 
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Table 5a. External returns to education estimates, area defined by NUTS and city size 
ECHP  Tertiary education  NUTS and town size  Secondary education  NUTS and town size 
   Estimation  External     Human     Estimation  External     Human    
   Method  Return  t  Return  t  Method  Return  t  Return  t 
Austria  OLS  0.9  7.93  6.3  14.62  SEL  0.4  7.38  6.9  26.17 
Belgium  IV  0.5  4.67  6.8  14.18  OLS  0.6  4.95  6.2  22.00 
France  SEL  0.7  14.29  10.8  34.91  SEL  0.1  1.17  7.7  14.63 
Greece  SEL  0.7  7.54  3.4  6.58  SEL  0.5  9.51  4.9  13.13 
Ireland  IV  1.7  9.79  6.9  17.69  SEL  0.8  1.76  4.2  2.32 
Portugal  IV  1.8  20.40  10.7  20.00  SEl  0.9  21.10  11.7  57.23 
Source: Own computation based on ECHP data. 
OLS  stands  for  standard  regression  model,  IV  for  instrumental  variable  and  SEL  for  model  with  selection 





Table 5b. External returns to education estimates, area defined by NUTS  
ECHP  Tertiary education  NUTS only  Secondary education  NUTS only 
   Estimation  External     Human     Estimation  External     Human    
   Method  Return  t  Return  t  Method  Return  t  Return  t 
Austria  SEL  0.1  2.21  9.9  17.48  OLS  0.9  4.90  6.2  21.54 
Finland  SEL  1.1  16.65  8.6  14.90  OLS  1.3  11.00  5.3  16.88 
France  SEL  1.0  16.92  10.9  36.41  IV  0.4  9.638  8.2  59.39 
Greece  SEL  0.5  5.51  4.6  9.33  SEL  0.2  1.92  5.0  11.21 
Ireland  SEL  2.3  7.44  3.2  1.99  IV  0.0  14.02  4.7  14.02 
Italy  SEL  -0.1  -0.41  6.8  14.31  SEL  1.1  7.84  4.9  14.35 
Portugal  SEL  2.3  11.52  13.5  14.73  IV  1.5  22.55  12.9  59.28 
Spain  SEL  1.1  10.86  7.2  9.08  SEL  0.7  6.81  6.3  19.97 
Sweden  SEL  1.1  22.11  7.5  17.18  OLS  1.1  9.45  4.3  15.11 
United 
Kingdom  SEL  0.3  6.13  -0.8  -0.76  OLS  0.7  9.58  3.7  27.12 
Source: Own computation based on ECHP data. 
OLS  stands  for  standard  regression  model,  IV  for  instrumental  variable  and  SEL  for  model  with  selection 
equation. Please note that the returns are in percentage points.  
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Table 6a. External returns to education estimates, area defined by NUTS and city size 
CHER  Tertiary education  NUTS and town size  Secondary education  NUTS and town size 
   Estimation  External     Human     Estimation  External     Human    
   Method  Return  t  Return  t  Method  Return  t  Return  t 
Austria  OLS  1.1  3.52  6.6  8.94  IV  0.6  2.92  6.9  16.27 
Belgium  OLS  0.4  2.63  6.5  4.39  OLS  0.3  1.69  5.5  21.70 
France  OLS  0.8  9.29  14.4  6.05  OLS  0.4  4.93  8.3  40.43 
Greece  IV  1.4  7.24  3.5  2.52  OLS  0.9  7.05  7.5  17.65 
Hungary  OLS  1.4  9.47  9.8  9.83  OLS  0.8  9.76  9.3  25.60 
Ireland  SEL  1.9  4.77  5.6  8.40  OLS  1.6  4.93  7.0  16.57 
Portugal  OLS  1.5  10.45  9.6  6.88  OLS  1.0  7.46  13.7  47.37 
Source: Own computation based on CHER data. 
OLS  stands  for  standard  regression  model,  IV  for  instrumental  variable  and  SEL  for  model  with  selection 





Table 6b. External returns to education estimates, area defined by NUTS  
CHER  Tertiary education  NUTS only  Secondary education  NUTS only 
   Estimation  External     Human     Estimation  External     Human    
   Method  Return  t  Return  t  Method  Return  t  Return  t 
Austria  IV  1.4  6.51  5.1  12.54  IV  0.4  3.78  5.6  18.71 
Belgium  OLS  0.3  2.32  6.6  4.26  OLS  0.3  1.94  5.5  21.74 
France  OLS  1.1  20.07  9.0  25.35  IV  0.2  5.52  8.5  72.55 
Greece  SEL  0.7  8.50  4.7  17.90  SEL  0.5  13.37  5.5  29.90 
Hungary  SEL  1.4  6.98  9.6  18.00  SEL  0.7  9.68  4.1  11.14 
Ireland  IV  1.3  8.97  5.6  10.92  SEL  0.9  10.96  7.5  39.92 
Italy                 SEL  0.8  13.03  6.1  48.70 
Portugal  SEL  2.0  10.43  11.5  26.68  SEL  1.3  19.90  4.9  30.42 
Spain  SEL  0.8  9.11  5.0  14.68  SEL  1.0  20.36  6.2  42.32 
Source: Own computation based on CHER data. 
OLS  stands  for  standard  regression  model,  IV  for  instrumental  variable  and  SEL  for  model  with  selection 
equation. Please note that the returns are in percentage points.    27 
Statistical annex. Contains full estimation results. 
 
Table A1. ECHP based results with area defined by NUTS and town size 
country  AUT  BEL  FRA  GRE  IRE  PRT 
   tertiary 
estimation  OLS  IV  SEL  SEL  IV  IV 
external  0.87  0.54  0.70  0.66  1.66  1.84 
   7.93  4.67  14.29  7.54  9.79  20.40 
experience  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.05 
   10.25  19.17  30.82  17.66  12.20  25.57 
exp2*100  -0.04  -0.07  -0.09  -0.08  -0.09  -0.06 
   -6.13  -12.70  -19.93  -11.30  -9.68  -20.81 
year of education  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.03  0.07  0.11 
   14.62  14.18  34.91  6.58  17.69  20.00 
public   0.06  -0.02  0.03  0.09  0.16  0.15 
 employment  4.62  -2.05  3.17  7.47  10.93  12.19 
self employment  -0.32  -0.15  0.02  -0.09  0.13  -0.17 
   -14.34  -6.64  1.12  -6.69  6.15  -13.19 
female  -0.35  -0.31  -0.29  -0.23  -0.44  -0.39 
   -28.58  -28.52  -34.34  -19.04  -30.02  -41.99 
family  -0.02                
   -1.71                
Hausman  1.00                
Sargan     0.26        0.67  0.34 
Mills        -0.14  -0.10       
         -2.77  -2.51       
   secondary 
estimation  SEL  OLS  SEL  SEL  SEL  SEL 
external  0.36  0.64  0.12  0.47  0.76  0.94 
   7.38  4.59  1.17  9.51  1.76  21.10 
experience  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05 
   9.32  17.39  7.84  7.98  3.12  22.07 
exp2*100  -0.03  -0.06  -0.04  -0.06  -0.06  -0.05 
   -5.88  -12.13  -5.66  -6.64  -2.23  -16.27 
year of education  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.05  0.04  0.12 
   26.17  22.00  14.63  13.13  2.32  57.23 
public  0.02  -0.02  0.08  0.15  0.14  0.19 
 employment  1.85  -1.88  3.31  8.92  2.35  19.26 
self employment  -0.44  -0.14  -0.01  -0.06  0.02  -0.31 
   -22.67  -6.51  -0.13  -3.65  0.20  -25.66 
female  -0.29  -0.33  -0.24  -0.15  -0.25  -0.37 
   -15.08  -8.64  -8.48  -4.35  -2.31  -26.31 
family     0.05             
      4.29             
Hausman     1.00             
Sargan                   
Mills  0.56 
 
0.01  0.19  0.76  0.07 
   3.02     0.14  4.84  3.39  1.38 
Source: Own computation based on ECHP data. 
The top number in each row represents coefficients values below are t-statistics. In case of Hausmann and 
Sargan test p-values are reported  
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Table A2. ECHP based results with area defined by NUTS  
country  AUT  FIN  FRA  GRE  IRE  ITA  PRT  SPA  SWE  UK 
   tertiary 
estimation  SEL  SEL  SEL  SEL  SEL     SEL  SEL  SEL  SEL 
external  0.54  1.07  0.99  0.45  2.29     2.31  1.12  1.07  0.30 
   2.21  16.65  16.92  5.51  7.44     11.52  10.86  22.11  6.13 
experience  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.04     0.08  0.07  0.03  0.05 
   10.92  17.73  34.28  22.05  8.91     18.69  25.45  16.47  20.98 
exp2*100  -0.05  -0.08  -0.10  -0.10  -0.06     -0.13  -0.11  -0.05  -0.09 
   -7.06  -12.08  -22.56  -14.64  -5.12     -11.71  -15.30  -11.88  -16.18 
year of education  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.05  0.03     0.13  0.07  0.07  -0.01 
   17.48  14.90  36.41  9.33  1.99     14.73  9.08  17.18  -0.76 
public   0.00  0.02  0.03  0.10  0.13     0.09  0.11  -0.09  0.01 
 employment  0.25  2.19  3.04  8.67  7.54     5.95  10.12  -11.68  1.19 
self employment  -0.46  -0.26  0.04  -0.09  -0.01     -0.47  -0.35  -1.05  -0.28 
   -23.99  -16.89  2.83  -7.72  -0.21     -18.34  -22.31  -65.92  -16.85 
female  -0.37  -0.34  -0.29  -0.22  -0.35     -0.25  -0.24  -0.30  -0.27 
   -19.67  -31.78  -37.24  -20.94  -17.23     -18.16  -23.11  -37.90  -25.23 
family                               
                                
Hausman                               
Sargan                               
Mills ratio  -7.67  0.01  0.02  0.25  -9.18     -0.04  -0.29  0.20  -0.09 
   -44.70  0.22  0.48  8.05  -47.89     -0.68  -7.28  2.94  -0.87 
   secondary 
estimation  OLS  OLS  IV  SEL  IV  SEL  IV  SEL  OLS  OLS 
external  0.91  1.26  0.41  0.16  0.75  1.10  1.47  0.74  1.08  0.73 
   4.90  11.00  9.64  1.92  7.89  7.84  22.55  6.81  9.45  9.58 
experience  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.03 
   5.35  7.56  28.26  6.15  19.67  4.16  20.64  14.50  6.65  19.04 
exp2*100  -0.02  -0.04  -0.06  -0.05  -0.07  -0.03  -0.08  -0.07  -0.03  -0.07 
   -3.17  -5.96  -19.63  -5.02  -14.45  -2.35  -14.33  -10.45  -5.31  -16.25 
year of education  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.13  0.06  0.04  0.04 
   21.54  16.88  59.39  11.21  14.02  14.35  59.28  19.97  15.11  27.12 
public   0.06  0.06  0.10  0.14  0.16  0.05  0.15  0.15  -0.11  0.06 
 employment  5.32  5.02  13.64  7.27  13.58  3.78  14.07  10.60  -9.22  6.22 
self employment  -0.33  -0.15  0.06  -0.07  0.08  -0.36  -0.18  -0.27  -0.96  -0.18 
   -16.71  -6.72  4.41  -3.82  4.70  -25.14  -14.80  -17.18  -39.96  -13.44 
female  -0.24  -0.21  -0.25  -0.08  -0.23  -0.19  -0.32  -0.21  -0.21  -0.31 
   -8.53  -8.61  -33.02  -1.88  -11.16  -10.38  -16.97  -9.88  -8.04  -24.63 
family  0.02  0.06                    0.04  0.09 
   1.37  4.98                    3.81  4.92 
Hausman  0.30  1.00                    1.00  1.00 
Sargan        0.38     0.62     0.86          
Mills ratio 








            6.56     3.70     -2.56       
Source: Own computation based on ECHP data. 
The top number in each row represents coefficients values below are t-statistics. In case of Hausmann and 
Sargan test p-values are reported  
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Table A3. CHER based results with area defined by NUTS and town size 
country  AUT  BEL  FRA  GRE  HUN  IRE  PRT 
   tertiary education 
estimation  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  OLS  SEL  OLS 
external  1.09  0.38  0.76  1.22  1.44  1.92  1.49 
   3.52  2.63  9.29  4.96  9.47  4.77  10.45 
experience  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.06 
   7.22  12.21  22.74  16.51  8.57  7.86  21.66 
exp2*100  -0.04  -0.07  -0.09  -0.09  -0.08  -0.07  -0.11 
   -4.40  -7.42  -15.43  -9.38  -7.31  -5.77  -17.33 
year of education  0.07  0.06  0.14  0.03  0.10  0.06  0.10 
   8.94  4.39  6.05  1.44  9.83  8.40  6.88 
public   0.01  -0.07  0.09  0.13  0.01  0.15  0.11 
 employment  0.60  -4.34  6.78  6.65  0.47  5.00  6.31 
self employment  -1.22  -0.27  -1.46  -1.18  -1.13  -0.74  -0.63 
   -23.79  -9.17  -22.01  -27.43  -13.93  -8.53  -10.96 
female  -0.31  -0.27  -0.29  -0.30  -0.29  -0.33  -0.34 
   -15.89  -17.64  -20.70  -15.70  -12.51  -12.04  -24.47 
family  -0.12  0.04  -0.01     -0.02     -0.10 
   -5.37  1.81  -0.38     -0.49     -1.84 
Hausman  0.00  0.39  1.00     1.00     1.00 
Sargan           0.63          
Mills ratio 
         
-8.91    
  
         
-25.29    
   secondary education 
estimation  IV  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
external  0.56  0.28  0.36  0.91  0.77  1.60  1.04 
   2.92  1.69  4.93  7.05  9.76  4.93  7.46 
experience  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.06 
   6.72  13.06  22.58  16.74  6.76  9.44  20.99 
exp2*100  -0.03  -0.06  -0.08  -0.10  -0.06  -0.08  -0.12 
   -3.99  -8.27  -14.63  -11.58  -5.22  -7.60  -14.12 
year of education  0.07  0.05  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.14 
   16.27  21.70  40.43  17.65  25.60  16.57  47.37 
public   0.02  -0.07  0.09  0.13  0.01  0.13  0.11 
 employment  1.03  -4.40  6.71  6.70  0.41  5.44  6.40 
self employment  -1.22  -0.27  -1.46  -1.16  -1.12  -0.78  -0.63 
   -23.74  -9.19  -22.01  -27.02  -13.92  -12.06  -11.02 
female  -0.31  -0.26  -0.34  -0.28  -0.37  -0.40  -0.32 
   -18.69  -17.13  -24.64  -16.06  -12.16  -14.02  -22.72 
family     0.04  0.02  -0.04  0.03  0.18  -0.12 
      1.74  1.12  -0.92  0.61  4.65  -2.18 
Hausman     1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.66  1.00 
Sargan  0.88                   
Mills ratio                      
                       
Source: Own computation based on CHER data. 
The top number in each row represents coefficients values below are t-statistics. In case of Hausmann and 
Sargan test p-values are reported  
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Table A4. CHER based results with area defined by NUTS  
country  AUT  BEL  FRA  GRE  HUN  IRE  ITA  PRT  SPA 
   tertiary 
estimation  IV  OLS  OLS  SEL  SEL  IV     SEL  SEL 
external  1.42  0.33  1.11  0.69  1.36  1.31     1.96  0.76 
   6.51  2.32  20.07  8.50  6.98  8.97     10.43  9.11 
experience  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.04     0.07  0.07 
   10.03  12.15  36.38  24.71  8.73  20.73     23.06  31.72 
exp2*100  -0.02  -0.07  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  -0.07     -0.12  -0.11 
   -4.60  -7.36  -24.37  -15.45  -6.77  -15.03     -14.26  -18.93 
year of education  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.05  0.10  0.06     0.12  0.05 
   12.54  4.26  25.35  17.90  18.00  10.92     26.68  14.68 
public   0.05  -0.07  0.09  0.11  0.05  0.18     0.09  0.10 
 employment  4.60  -4.23  12.53  10.73  2.13  17.55     6.37  9.84 
self employment  -1.02  -0.27  -1.47  -0.85  -1.15  -0.95 
 
-0.40  -0.84 
   -32.88  -9.17  -47.17  -31.15  -14.42  -29.12 
 
-8.34  -24.53 
female  -0.28  -0.27  -0.29  -0.19  -0.23  -0.40     -0.22  -0.20 
   -26.99  -17.54  -43.79  -18.96  -10.26  -32.40     -17.42  -20.30 
family     0.04  0.03                   
      1.68  2.66                   
Hausman      1.00  1.00                   
Sargan  0.88              0.62          
Mills ratio           -0.25  2.21        -0.28  0.21 
            -7.17  3.05        -4.83  2.08 
   secondary 
estimation  IV  OLS  IV  SEL  SEL  SEL  IV  SEL  SEL 
external  0.43  0.33  0.24  0.50  0.72  0.85  0.91  1.26  1.01 
   3.78  1.94  5.52  13.37  9.68  10.96  13.38  19.90  20.36 
experience  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.06 
   10.60  13.16  35.34  29.91  11.14  22.15  23.58  30.42  42.32 
exp2*100  -0.02  -0.06  -0.08  -0.09  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06  -0.08  -0.10 
   -4.14  -8.38  -19.41  -23.13  -9.51  -16.52  -15.33  -24.91  -31.09 
year of education  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.12  0.08 
   18.71  21.74  72.55  41.88  36.30  39.92  36.82  77.80  63.46 
public   0.04  -0.07  0.10  0.16  0.05  0.18  0.05  0.21  0.14 
 employment  4.23  -4.30  13.49  16.93  3.14  17.15  7.56  25.71  16.40 
self emploment  -1.02  -0.27  -1.46  -1.12  -0.74  -0.85  -1.22  -0.74  -0.87 
   -32.80  -9.20  -46.89  -55.90  -14.97  -26.06  -64.97  -34.41  -36.04 
female  -0.23  -0.26  -0.34  -0.27  -0.29  -0.35  -0.27  -0.32  -0.25 
   -13.87  -17.08  -47.15  -28.13  -19.36  -34.34  -33.14  -43.73  -31.60 
family     0.04                      
      1.67                      
Hausman     1.00                      
Sargan  0.27     0.69           0.43       
Mills ration           -0.25  1.25  0.34     -0.14  0.02 
            -8.71  1.63  5.36     -4.02  0.16 
Source: Own computation based on ECHP data. 
The top number in each row represents coefficients values below are t-statistics. In case of Hausman and Sargan 
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Table A5. OLS models, area defined by NUTS and town size 
ECHP 
Tertiary, OLS  Secondary, OLS 
external  t  human  t  hausman  external  t  human  t  hausman 
Austria  0.87  7.93  0.06  14.62  1.00  0.50  8.76  0.06  17.37  1.00 
Belgium  0.63  5.94  0.06  13.33  0.00  0.64  4.95  0.06  22.00  0.00 
France  0.76  17.45  0.10  40.85  0.00  0.57  13.07  0.08  39.30  0.00 
Greece  1.04  14.78  0.05  15.73  0.00  0.42  10.95  0.06  28.30  0.00 
Ireland  1.20  6.64  0.07  18.41  0.00  0.83  6.63  0.07  17.29  0.00 
Portugal  1.68  19.32  0.11  20.36  0.00  1.00  19.42  0.13  58.77  0.00 
 
Table A6. OLS models, area defined by NUTS 
ECHP 
Tertiary, OLS  Secondary, OLS 
external  t  human  t  hausman  external  t  human  t  hausman 
Austria  1.34  5.55  0.06  16.76  0.00  0.91  4.90  0.06  21.54  0.30 
Finland  1.16  14.18  0.11  21.02  0.00  1.26  11.00  0.05  16.88  1.00 
France  1.23  22.46  0.11  46.02  0.00  1.00  18.09  0.08  46.68  0.00 
Greece  0.79  11.00  0.06  17.33  0.00  0.33  8.75  0.06  30.74  0.00 
Ireland  1.71  8.16  0.07  23.60  0.00  0.89  7.29  0.06  15.58  0.00 
Italy  -1.06  -2.99  0.04  15.75  0.00  1.81  15.27  0.05  26.94  0.00 
Portugal  3.23  22.95  0.12  25.39  0.00  1.80  24.16  0.13  52.95  0.00 
Spain  1.70  17.21  0.06  11.30  0.00  0.94  13.15  0.07  29.18  0.00 
Sweden  0.79  10.87  0.07  20.19  1.00  1.08  9.45  0.04  15.11  1.00 
United Kingdom  0.87  10.55  0.04  4.92  0.00  0.73  9.58  0.04  27.12  1.00 
 
 
Table A7. IV models, area defined by NUTS and town size 
ECHP 
tertiary, IV  secondary, IV 
external  t  human  t  sargan  external  t  human  t  sargan 
Austria  1.00  8.42  0.06  14.14  0.00  0.47  8.37  0.06  19.03  0.00 
Belgium  0.54  4.67  0.07  14.18  0.00  0.24  2.56  0.06  26.26  0.00 
France  0.71  16.29  0.10  43.99  0.00  0.21  5.89  0.08  49.80  0.00 
Greece  0.85  11.02  0.05  13.89  0.00  0.37  8.91  0.05  28.34  0.00 
Ireland  1.66  9.79  0.07  17.69  0.00  0.95  8.24  0.06  15.42  0.00 
Portugal  1.84  20.40  0.11  20.00  0.00  1.02  17.13  0.13  59.59  0.00 
 
Table A8. IV models, area defined by NUTS 
ECHP 
tertiary, IV  secondary, IV 
external  t  human  t  sargan  external  t  human  t  sargan 
Austria  1.14  4.78  0.06  23.52  0.01  0.33  2.53  0.06  23.67  0.00 
Finland  0.96  11.05  0.05  17.74  0.00  1.01  10.07  0.06  18.43  0.00 
France  1.01  21.50  0.09  64.47  0.00  0.41  9.64  0.08  59.39  0.00 
Greece  0.30  4.03  0.05  29.70  0.00  0.29  7.84  0.06  30.43  0.00 
Ireland  1.38  7.56  0.04  13.68  0.00  0.75  7.87  0.05  14.02  0.00 
Italy  -0.19  -0.60  0.05  26.79  0.00  1.16  13.35  0.05  28.02  0.00 
Portugal  2.59  21.58  0.13  59.95  0.00  1.47  22.55  0.13  59.28  0.00 
Spain  0.86  7.95  0.07  33.42  0.00  0.74  11.21  0.07  34.75  0.00 
Sweden  0.92  12.55  0.05  18.38  0.00  1.36  11.95  0.05  17.23  0.00 
United Kingdom  0.18  3.85  0.04  28.60  0.00  0.35  7.09  0.04  27.89  0.00 
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Table A9.SEL models, area defined by NUTS and town size 
ECHP 
tertiary, selection 
external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  0.79  6.90  0.09  15.76  0.34  1.80 
Belgium  0.71  7.85  0.06  5.72  0.08  1.36 
France  0.70  14.29  0.11  34.91  -0.14  -2.77 
Greece  0.66  7.54  0.03  6.58  -0.10  -2.51 
Ireland  1.55  3.38  0.01  0.25  -0.74  -0.77 
Portugal  1.22  8.83  0.13  14.71  0.06  0.79 
  
secondary, selection 
external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  0.36  7.38  0.07  26.17  0.56  3.02 
Belgium  0.41  5.72  0.05  24.62  -0.09  -1.36 
France  0.12  1.17  0.08  14.63  0.01  0.14 
Greece  0.47  9.51  0.05  13.13  0.19  4.84 
Ireland  0.76  1.76  0.04  2.32  0.76  3.39 
Portugal  0.94  21.10  0.12  57.23  0.07  1.38 
 
Table A10. SEL models, area defined by NUTS 
ECHP 
tertiary, selection 
external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  0.05  2.21  0.10  17.48  -7.67  -44.70 
Finland  1.07  16.65  0.09  14.90  0.01  0.22 
France  0.99  16.92  0.11  36.41  0.02  0.48 
Greece  0.45  5.51  0.05  9.33  0.25  8.05 
Ireland  2.29  7.44  0.32  1.99  -9.17  -47.88 
Italy  -0.13  -0.41  0.07  14.31  0.08  1.66 
Portugal  2.31  11.52  0.13  14.73  -0.04  -0.68 
Spain  1.12  10.86  0.07  9.08  -0.29  -7.28 
Sweden  1.07  22.11  0.07  17.18  0.20  2.94 
United Kingdom  0.30  6.13  -0.01  -0.76  -0.09  -0.87 
   secondary, selection 
   external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  0.16  1.41  0.07  31.48  1.05  6.51 
Finland  0.94  12.96  0.06  28.50  -0.07  -1.29 
France  0.31  2.83  0.08  21.44  0.09  1.52 
Greece  0.16  1.92  0.05  11.21  0.22  6.56 
Ireland  0.73  1.33  0.04  1.80  1.01  6.10 
Italy  1.10  7.84  0.05  14.35  0.17  3.70 
Portugal  1.43  20.58  0.12  64.61  0.05  1.04 
Spain  0.74  6.81  0.06  19.97  -0.10  -2.56 
Sweden  1.36  17.08  0.05  24.20  0.12  1.64 
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Table A11. OLS models, area defined by NUTS and town size 
CHER 
tertriary, OLS  secondary, OLS 
external  t  human  t  hausman  external  t  human  t  hausman 
Austria  1.09  3.52  0.07  8.94  0.00  0.43  2.33  0.07  13.56  0.00 
Belgium  0.38  2.63  0.06  4.39  0.39  0.28  1.69  0.05  21.70  1.00 
France  0.76  9.29  0.14  6.05  1.00  0.36  4.93  0.08  40.43  1.00 
Greece  1.43  7.24  0.04  2.52  0.01  0.91  7.05  0.08  17.65  1.00 
Hungary  1.44  9.47  0.10  9.83  1.00  0.77  9.76  0.09  25.60  1.00 
Ireland  2.24  6.51  0.08  8.18  0.00  1.60  4.93  0.07  16.57  0.00 
Portugal  1.49  10.45  0.10  6.88  1.00  1.04  7.46  0.14  47.37  1.00 
 
Table A12. OLS models, area defined by NUTS 
CHER 
tertriary, OLS  secondary, OLS 
external  t  human  t  hausman  external  t  human  t  hausman 
Austria  1.43  6.68  0.05  13.38  0.00  0.88  5.37  0.06  17.17  0.00 
Belgium  0.33  2.32  0.07  4.26  1.00  0.33  1.94  0.05  21.74  1.00 
France  1.11  20.07  0.09  25.35  1.00  0.79  14.13  0.09  72.69  0.00 
Greece  0.67  6.36  0.03  3.07  0.00  0.08  0.85  0.06  14.78  1.00 
Hungary  1.63  10.49  0.09  11.95  0.00  0.87  10.68  0.10  35.67  0.00 
Ireland  0.49  2.75  0.06  11.25  0.00  0.47  3.11  0.08  34.57  0.00 
Italy  -1.65  -6.58  -0.01  -2.02  0.00  1.59  15.98  0.06  37.69  0.00 
Portugal  2.45  20.53  0.11  14.73  0.00  1.16  13.07  0.13  71.22  0.00 
Spain  1.18  13.59  0.02  2.17  0.00  1.06  16.68  0.09  49.11  0.00 
 
 
Table A13. IV models, area defined by NUTS and town size 
CHER 
tertiary, IV  secondary, IV 
external  t  human  t  sargan  external  t  human  t  sargan 
Austria  1.23  3.95  0.06  7.86  0.00  0.56  2.92  0.07  16.27  0.00 
Belgium  0.22  1.43  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.34  2.21  0.06  22.21  0.00 
France  0.83  9.57  0.15  6.24  0.00  0.55  8.02  0.08  40.06  0.00 
Greece  1.22  4.96  0.03  1.44  0.63  0.91  12.75  0.08  23.64  0.42 
Hungary  1.48  9.44  0.09  9.03  0.00  0.70  9.07  0.09  24.94  0.00 
Ireland  1.90  5.55  0.08  7.41  0.00  1.48  4.80  0.07  16.73  0.00 
Portugal  1.44  7.69  0.08  1.82  0.00  0.89  12.00  0.14  51.02  0.00 
 
Table A14. IV models, area defined by NUTS 
CHER 
tertiary, IV  secondary, IV 
external  t  human  t  sargan  external  t  human  t  sargan 
Austria  1.42  6.51  0.05  12.54  0.00  0.43  3.78  0.06  18.71  0.00 
Belgium  0.43  2.58  0.03  1.05  0.00  0.55  3.03  0.06  22.17  0.00 
France  1.07  21.83  0.09  30.83  0.00  0.24  5.52  0.09  72.55  0.00 
Greece  -0.07  -0.70  -0.05  -5.56  0.00  0.19  2.29  0.06  17.81  0.00 
Hungary  1.73  10.96  0.09  11.52  0.00  0.89  10.90  0.10  35.62  0.00 
Ireland  1.31  8.97  0.06  10.92  0.00  0.75  7.22  0.07  35.19  0.00 
Italy  -1.16  -5.10  -0.01  -2.05  0.00  0.91  13.38  0.06  36.82  0.00 
Portugal  1.67  15.11  -0.07  -3.05  0.00  0.89  11.61  0.13  68.58  0.00 
Spain  0.69  7.85  -0.05  -3.70  0.00  1.01  15.87  0.09  48.15  0.00 
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Table A15.SEL models, area defined by NUTS and town size 
CHER 
tertiary, selection 
external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  1.02  2.74  0.04  6.30       
Belgium  0.37  2.19  0.06  10.09  -6.85  -34.68 
France  0.85  6.48  0.03  3.59  -0.16  -2.78 
Greece  1.64  9.79  0.06  10.51       
Hungary  1.84  8.83  0.11  13.05  -0.01  -0.05 
Ireland  1.92  4.77  0.06  8.40       
Portugal  1.55  5.68  0.11  15.28  -8.91  -25.89 
CHER 
secondary, selection 
external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  0.13  0.65  0.03  1.48       
Belgium  0.28  1.98  -0.05  -3.47  -2.52  -15.46 
France  0.43  6.16  0.08  6.21  -0.33  -5.97 
Greece  0.88  13.28  0.15  7.69       
Hungary  0.76  10.37  0.04  1.94  -0.07  -0.47 
Ireland  1.21  4.09  0.16  6.33  1.21  4.43 
Portugal  0.79  9.71  0.16  10.66  0.80  3.73 
 
 
Table A16. SEL models, area defined by NUTS 
CHER 
tertiary, selection 
external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  1.02  4.29  0.05  13.97  0.42  1.09 
Belgium  0.40  2.40  0.06  10.09  0.04  0.10 
France  1.17  17.71  0.07  29.78  0.58  0.49 
Greece  0.69  8.50  0.05  17.90  -0.25  -7.17 
Hungary  1.36  6.98  0.10  18.00  2.21  3.05 
Ireland  1.63  9.60  0.06  20.25  0.07  1.26 
Italy  -1.10  -4.48  0.04  20.39  0.14  1.21 
Portugal  1.96  10.43  0.12  26.68  -0.28  -4.29 
Spain  0.76  9.11  0.05  14.68  0.21  2.08 
CHER 
secondary, selection 
external  t  human  t  lambda  t 
Austria  0.17  1.45  0.06  25.40  0.23  0.55 
Belgium  0.42  2.85  0.06  22.73  0.00  -0.01 
France  0.19  4.55  0.08  68.52  1.11  1.61 
Greece  0.50  13.37  0.07  41.88  -0.25  8.71 
Hungary  0.72  9.68  0.09  36.29  1.25  1.63 
Ireland  0.85  10.96  0.07  39.92  0.34  5.36 
Italy  0.82  13.03  0.06  48.70  0.25  2.42 
Portugal  1.26  19.90  0.12  77.80  -0.14  4.02 
Spain  1.01  20.36  0.08  63.46  0.02  0.16 
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